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This Article offers two different lenses for thinking about the 
“affordability” of legal education. Part I discusses a historical 
perspective focused on aggregated data over time: average tuition in 
relation to average salaries of law school graduates. Part II discusses 
a present day perspective, estimating the percentage of Class of 2011 
graduates for whom legal education might be considered affordable 
using a formula drawing on debt-to-income ratios associated with 
mortgages. Part III discusses the extent to which affordability may 
vary among public and private law schools, law schools in different 
states or regions, and for students with different LSAT and GPA 
profiles. Part IV concludes with a discussion of some of the 
challenges legal education will face as a result of legal education’s 
decreasing affordability. 
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I. CHANGES IN THE HISTORICAL RATIO BETWEEN AVERAGE TUITION 
AND AVERAGE SALARIES OF GRADUATES 
One way of thinking about the affordability of legal education is 
to look at trends over time. Several people have noted that tuition 
levels have increased dramatically since the 1980s and that student 
loan debt also has increased dramatically.
1
 The following table shows 
the average tuition and the annual growth in average tuition for 
public law schools (both resident and non-resident tuition), and 
private law schools from 1985 to 2011.
2
 
TABLE 1: AVERAGE TUITION AT LAW SCHOOLS  
FROM 1985–2011 
Year 
PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS 
PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS 
# 
RESIDENT NON-RESIDENT 
Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. # Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. 
1985 74 $2,006  $4,724  101 $7,526  
1986 74 $2,206 10% $5,160 9% 100 $8,225 9% 
1987 74 $2,398 9% $5,616 9% 99 $8,911 8% 
1988 74 $2,608 9% $6,017 7% 100 $9,652 8% 
1989 74 $2,916 12% $6,759 12% 101 $10,620 10% 
1990 74 $3,236 11% $7,365 9% 101 $11,728 10% 
1991 75 $3,591 11% $8,250 11% 101 $12,738 11% 
 
 1. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 107–14 (2012) (discussing 
significant increases in debt among law graduates); Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: 
The Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ 
Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1185, 1200–03 (2012); Peter A. Joy, The Cost 
of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 309, 312–17 (2012) (noting that many 
factors are driving up tuition costs including more hands-on learning); William D. Henderson & 
Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Law School Bubble: How Long Will it Last if Law Grads Can’t Pay 
Bills?, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2012, 5:20 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
the_law_school_bubble_how_long_will_it_last_if_law_grads_cant_pay_bills/; LAW SCHOOL 
TUITION BUBBLE, http://lawschooltuitionbubble.wordpress.com (last visited July 30, 2012). 
 2. Legal Education Statistics: Law School Tuition 1985–2011, A.B.A. LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012). 
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Year 
PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS 
PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS 
# 
RESIDENT NON-RESIDENT 
Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. # Avg. Tuition 
% 
Chg. 
1992 75 $4,015 12% $9,070 10% 101 $13,730 8% 
1993 75 $4,418 10% $9,763 8% 99 $14,828 8% 
1994 76 $5,016 14% $10,667 9% 102 $15,835 7% 
1995 76 $5,530 10% $11,683 10% 103 $16,798 6% 
1996 74 $5,955 8% $12,419 6% 103 $17,785 6% 
1997 76 $6,521 10% $13,234 7% 102 $18,726 5% 
1998 77 $6,943 6% $14,056 6% 104 $19,693 5% 
1999 77 $7,367 6% $14,754 5% 105 $20,709 5% 
2000 78 $7,790 6% $15,683 6% 105 $21,790 5% 
2001 78 $8,419 8% $16,643 6% 106 $22,961 5% 
2002 78 $9,392 12% $18,146 9% 108 $24,193 5% 
2003 78 $10,819 15% $20,171 11% 109 $25,574 6% 
2004 80 $11,860 10% $21,905 9% 108 $26,952 5% 
2005 80 $13,145 11% $22,987 5% 111 $28,900 7% 
2006 80 $14,245 8% $25,227 10% 115 $30,520 7% 
2007 80 $15,455 9% $26,691 6% 117 $32,367 6% 
2008 80 $16,836 9% $28,442 7% 118 $34,298 6% 
2009 80 $18,472 10% $30,413 7% 117 $35,743 4% 
2010 80 $20,238 10% $32,754 8% 119 $37,447 5% 
2011 81 $22,116 9% $34,865 6% 119 $39,184 5% 
 
Notably, average tuition for residents at public law schools has 
grown by the greatest percentage—slightly more than 1,000 percent 
between 1985 and 2011, averaging 10 percent per year. Average 
tuition for non-residents at public law schools has grown by more 
than 600 percent, an average of 8 percent per year. Growth in average 
tuition at private law schools is lower but still significant—more than 
400 percent, an average of 7 percent per year. 
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While one might infer that legal education must be less affordable 
as a result of these tuition increases, a better understanding of 
affordability can be garnered from some comparative data. Using the 
“investment” lens as a way of thinking about affordability, the 
average salaries of law graduates over the same period—offering 
some idea of return on investment—can serve as a meaningful 
comparison. 
Table 2 shows the average salary of all employed graduates, the 
average salary of graduates employed in private practice, and the 
average salary of graduates employed in “big firms”—firms with 101 
or more attorneys—for each year in the period from 1985 to 2011.3 
 
 3. The data in this average salary chart was prepared by Judy Collins, Research Director 
for the National Association of Legal Professionals (NALP). I am tremendously grateful to 
Judy Collins, and to Jim Leipold, the Executive Director of NALP, for their assistance in 
compiling and sharing this data. The only two data points on the chart that do not reflect 
average salaries are the “big firm” listings for 1989 and 1990: while NALP had overall averages 
and private practice averages for those two years, it did not have separate “average salary” data 
for graduates employed in “big firms” with 101 or more lawyers. NALP did have median salary 
data for graduates employed in “big firms” for 1989 and 1990, and medians for those two data 
points were used in this analysis rather than omitting data for those years altogether. The 
anomalous data points are italicized in the chart. 
 Notably, the average salary data is based on fairly robust samples. During the twenty-seven 
years reflected in the chart, NALP generally had no fewer than 15,000 reported salaries on 
which to base the overall averages and in some years had as many as 22,000 reported salaries. 
In general, NALP included salaries reported by somewhere between 59 percent and 72 percent 
of full-time employed graduates in any given year. Nonetheless, due to disproportionate salary 
reporting by “big firm” attorneys, particularly in recent years, the overall “average” salary 
shown may be higher than would be reflected if all employed graduates across all employment 
categories reported salaries. Beginning with its Jobs & JDs Class of 2009 report, NALP began 
calculating an adjusted overall mean salary in an effort to account for the impact of 
disproportionate “big firm” salary reporting on the overall mean salary. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR 
LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & JDS: EMPLOYMENT AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES—
CLASS OF 2009 16 (2010). The average salaries shown in the chart do not reflect any adjustment 
to account for the fact that disproportionate reporting of “big firm” salaries might result in 
higher overall and private practice average salaries than would be the case if all employed 
graduates reported salaries. 
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TABLE 2: AVERAGE SALARIES OF EMPLOYED LAW SCHOOL 
GRADUATES FROM 1985–2011 
Year 
OVERALL PRIVATE PRACTICE BIG FIRM (101+) 
Avg. Salary % Chg. Avg. Salary % Chg. Avg. Salary % Chg. 
1985 $29,225  $31,661  $41,256  
1986 $32,757 12% $36,050 14% $48,058 16% 
1987 $35,597 9% $39,847 11% $53,259 11% 
1988 $39,159 10% $44,545 12% $58,936 11% 
1989 $42,100 8% $44,690 0% $55,000 -7% 
1990 $44,290 5% $50,960 14% $65,000 18% 
1991 $44,300 0% $51,000 0% $66,020 2% 
1992 $42,600 -4% $48,400 -5% $65,660 -1% 
1993 $43,200 1% $49,000 1% $66,048 1% 
1994 $44,149 2% $50,075 2% $67,338 2% 
1995 $45,590 3% $51,612 3% $68,430 2% 
1996 $46,499 2% $52,844 2% $69,797 2% 
1997 $48,986 5% $56,085 6% $73,010 5% 
1998 $53,250 9% $61,887 10% $80,645 10% 
1999 $59,125 11% $69,863 13% $91,105 13% 
2000 $67,048 13% $82,114 18% $108,562 19% 
2001 $71,201 6% $86,837 6% $112,937 4% 
2002 $72,308 2% $87,174 0% $112,884 0% 
2003 $69,974 -3% $83,913 -4% $112,020 -1% 
2004 $70,105 0% $84,092 0% $112,205 0% 
2005 $72,730 4% $87,250 4% $114,209 2% 
2006 $77,990 7% $95,098 9% $124,480 9% 
2007 $86,396 11% $107,300 13% $140,044 13% 
2008 $92,009 6% $114,099 6% $146,408 5% 
2009 $93,454 2% $115,254 1% $146,792 0% 
2010 $84,111 -10% $106,444 -8% $144,306 -2% 
2011 $78,653 -6% $97,821 -8% $141,454 -2% 
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Notably, the average salary of all big firm attorneys grew by the 
largest percentage—nearly 250 percent or an average of 5 percent per 
year. At the same time, the average salary of all private practice 
attorneys grew nearly 210 percent or an average of nearly 5 percent 
per year, and the average salary overall grew roughly 170 percent, an 
average of 4 percent per year. 
One might use this tuition and salary data in a variety of ways to 
illuminate the affordability question. Simply comparing the average 
increase in tuition with the average increase in income, one sees that 
tuition increased roughly twice as fast as income. Another approach 
to comparing affordability changes over time is to calculate a ratio 
indicating average tuition as a percentage of average salary. The table 
below illustrates that approach. 
TABLE 3: RATIO OF RESIDENT TUITION AT PUBLIC LAW SCHOOLS IN 
COMPARISON TO EMPLOYED GRADUATES’ SALARIES 
 FROM 1985–20114 
YEAR 
RATIO OF TUITION TO AVERAGE SALARY 
TO OVERALL 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO PRIVATE PRACTICE 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO BIG FIRM (101+) 
AVERAGE SALARY 
1985 .07 .06 .05 
1987 .07 .06 .05 
1989 .07 .07 .05 
1991 .08 .07 .05 
1993 .10 .09 .07 
1995 .12 .11 .08 
1997 .13 .12 .09 
1999 .12 .11 .08 
2001 .12 .10 .07 
2003 .15 .13 .10 
2005 .18 .15 .12 
2007 .18 .14 .11 
 
 4. The ratios in the second column of Table 3 reflect average resident tuition at public 
law schools (third column of Table 1) in a given year divided by the overall average salary for 
employed graduates for that year (second column of Table 2). The ratios in the third column of 
Table 3 reflect average resident tuition at public law schools (third column of Table 1) in a 
given year divided by average private practice salary for that year (fourth column of Table 2). 
Ratios in the fourth column of Table 3 reflect average resident tuition at public law schools 
(third column of Table 1) in a given year divided by average big firm salary for that year (sixth 
column of Table 2). 
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YEAR 
RATIO OF TUITION TO AVERAGE SALARY 
TO OVERALL 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO PRIVATE PRACTICE 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO BIG FIRM (101+) 
AVERAGE SALARY 
2009 .20 .16 .13 
2010 .24 .19 .14 
2011 .28 .23 .16 
 
Table 3 reports the average resident tuition for public law schools 
in relation to the average salaries of employed graduates over time. 
Looking at this data carefully, one sees that the ratio of tuition to 
salary grew in all three salary categories, but grew the least in 
relation to big firm salaries (slightly more than tripling), grew more 
in relation to private practice salaries (nearly quadrupling), and grew 
the most in relation to the overall average salary (quadrupling). This 
demonstrates that for the average state resident attending a public law 
school in her state and securing a law job reflecting the average 
salary for all employed law graduates, law school is now four times 
as expensive as it was in 1985; for that same average state resident 
who gets a law job in private practice with the average private 
practice salary, law school is now nearly four times as expensive as it 
was in 1985; and for the same average state resident who gets a job in 
a big firm with the average big firm salary, law school is now more 
than three times as expensive as it was in 1985. Most significantly, 
perhaps, the ratio of tuition to salary grew significantly—40 percent 
for the overall average salary (from .20 to .28) and more than 43 
percent for the average private practice salary (from .16 to .23) —in 
just the last three years. In those years, resident tuition at public law 
schools has continued to increase on average while average salaries 
have declined. 
 
TABLE 4: RATIO OF NON-RESIDENT TUITION AT PUBLIC LAW 
SCHOOLS IN COMPARISON TO EMPLOYED GRADUATES’  
SALARIES FROM 1985–2011 
YEAR 
RATIO OF TUITION TO AVERAGE SALARY 
TO OVERALL 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO PRIVATE PRACTICE 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO BIG FIRM (101+) 
AVERAGE SALARY 
1985 .16 .15 .11 
1987 .16 .14 .11 
1989 .16 .15 .12 
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YEAR 
RATIO OF TUITION TO AVERAGE SALARY 
TO OVERALL 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO PRIVATE PRACTICE 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO BIG FIRM (101+) 
AVERAGE SALARY 
1991 .19 .16 .12 
1993 .23 .20 .15 
1995 .26 .23 .17 
1997 .27 .24 .18 
1999 .25 .21 .16 
2001 .23 .19 .15 
2003 .29 .24 .18 
2005 .32 .26 .20 
2007 .31 .25 .19 
2009 .33 .26 .21 
2010 .39 .31 .23 
2011 .44 .36 .25 
 
Table 4 reports the average non-resident tuition for public law 
schools in relation to the average salaries of employed graduates over 
time.
5
 Looking at this data carefully, one sees that the ratio of average 
non-resident tuition to average salary grew in all three salary 
categories, but grew the least in relation to average big firm salary 
(127 percent), grew slightly more in relation to average private 
practice salary (140 percent) and grew the most in relation to the 
overall average salary (175 percent). This demonstrates that for the 
average law student going to a public law school in a different state 
who gets a law job reflecting the average salary for employed 
graduates, law school is now nearly three times as expensive as it was 
in 1985; for that same average law student who gets a law job in 
private practice with the average private practice salary, law school is 
now nearly two and a half times as expensive as it was in 1985; and 
for the same average law student who gets a job in a big firm with the 
average big firm salary, law school is now more than twice as 
 
 5. The ratios in the second column of Table 4 reflect average non-resident tuition at 
public law schools (fifth column of Table 1) in a given year divided by overall average salary 
for employed graduates for that year (second column of Table 2). The ratios in the third column 
of Table 4 reflect average non-resident tuition at public law schools (fifth column of Table 1) in 
a given year divided by average private practice salary for graduates for that year (fourth 
column of Table 2). The ratios in the fourth column of Table 4 reflect average non-resident 
tuition at public law schools (fifth column of Table 1) in a given year divided by average big 
firm salary for that year (sixth column of Table 2). 
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expensive as it was in 1985. Most significantly, perhaps, the ratio of 
tuition to salary grew significantly—33 percent for the overall 
average salary (from .33 to .44) and nearly 40 percent for the average 
private practice salary (from .26 to .36) in just the last three years, 
when non-resident tuition continued to increase and average salaries 
declined. It is also worth noting that when one compares the data in 
Table 3 with the data in Table 4, residents at public law schools faced 
greater increases in relative cost (or greater decreases in affordability) 
than non-residents.
6
 
TABLE 5: RATIO OF TUITION AT PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS IN 
COMPARISON TO EMPLOYED GRADUATES’ SALARIES  
FROM 1985–2011 
YEAR 
RATIO OF TUITION TO AVERAGE SALARY 
TO OVERALL 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO PRIVATE PRACTICE 
AVERAGE SALARY 
TO BIG FIRM (101+) 
AVERAGE SALARY 
1985 .26 .24 .18 
1987 .25 .22 .17 
1989 .25 .24 .19 
1991 .29 .25 .19 
1993 .34 .30 .22 
1995 .37 .33 .25 
1997 .38 .33 .26 
1999 .35 .30 .23 
2001 .32 .26 .20 
2003 .37 .30 .23 
2005 .40 .33 .25 
2007 .37 .30 .23 
2009 .38 .31 .24 
2010 .45 .35 .26 
2011 .50 .40 .28 
 
Table 5 reports the average tuition for private law schools in 
relation to the average salaries of employed graduates over time.
7
 The 
 
 6. The relationship between ratios changed from more than double for non-residents 
compared to residents (.16, .15, .11 in 2011 compared to .07, .06, .05 in 1985) to approximately 
one and a half times for non-residents compared to residents (.44, .36, .25 in 2011 compared to 
.28, .23, .16 in 1985). 
 7. The ratios in the second column of Table 5 reflect average tuition at private law 
schools (eighth column of Table 1) in a given year divided by overall average salary for 
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data show that the ratio of tuition to salary grew in all three salary 
categories, but grew the least in relation to average big firm salary 
(56 percent), grew slightly more in relation to average private 
practice salary (67 percent), and grew the most in relation to the 
overall average salary (92 percent). This demonstrates that for the 
average law student graduating from a private law school who 
secures a law job reflecting the average salary for employed 
graduates, law school is now nearly twice as expensive as it was in 
1985; for that same average law student who gets a private practice 
law job with the average private practice salary, law school is now 
one and two-thirds times as expensive as it was in 1985; and for the 
same average law student who gets a big firm job with the average 
big firm salary, law school is now roughly one and a half times as 
expensive as it was in 1985. Perhaps most significantly, the ratio of 
tuition to salary grew nearly 30 percent for overall average salary and 
average private practice salary in just the last three years—from .38 
to .50 for the overall average salary and from .31 to .40 for the 
average private practice salary—during a period in which average 
tuition continued to increase while average salaries declined.  
It is also worth noting that when one compares the data in Table 5 
with the data in Tables 3 and 4, students at public law schools faced 
greater percentage increases in relative cost (or greater percentage 
decreases in affordability) than students at private law schools 
between 1985 and 2011. That said, students at private law schools 
still face greater relative costs (they have higher average tuition to 
average salary ratios) than do non-residents at public law schools, 
who face greater relative costs than do residents at public law 
schools. Phrased differently, in 1985, the ratio of average resident 
tuition at public law schools relative to the overall average salary of 
employed graduates was one-quarter the ratio of the average private 
law school tuition relative to the overall average salary of employed 
graduates (.07 compared to .28). By 2011, however, the ratio of 
 
employed graduates for that year (second column of Table 2). The ratios in the third column of 
Table 5 reflect average tuition at private law schools (eighth column of Table 1) in a given year 
divided by average private practice salary for that year (fourth column of Table 2). The ratios in 
the fourth column of Table 5 reflect average tuition at private law schools (eighth column of 
Table 1) in a given year divided by the average big firm salary for that year (sixth column of 
Table 2). 
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average resident tuition at public law schools relative to the overall 
average salary of graduates was more than one-half of the ratio of 
private law school tuition relative to the overall average salary of 
graduates (.28 compared to .50). 
In other words, the affordability gap between public law schools 
and private law schools has been closing as average tuition has 
increased faster at public law schools than at private law schools.
8
  
II. LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL AFFORDABILITY TODAY USING 
PROFESSOR CHEN’S FORMULA 
In his recent article—A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of 
Educational Debt to Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School 
Graduates’ Economic Viability—Professor Jim Chen uses the 
framework of debt-to-income ratios used in mortgage lending as a 
lens for viewing the economic well-being of law school graduates 
based on the relationship between their incomes and levels of debt.
9
 
Professor Chen posits that “[t]he spread between the front-end and 
back-end ratios in mortgage lending provides a basis for 
extrapolating the maximum amount of educational debt that a student 
should incur.”10 Most real estate lenders cap the front-end ratio at 28 
percent and the back-end ratio at 36 percent, although the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) will in some circumstances allow a 
 
 8. Note, however, that the disproportionate reporting of big firm salaries means that 
NALP’s overall average salary data and average private practice salary data in recent years are 
higher than they would be if all employed graduates reported their salaries. See supra note 3. 
Therefore, the tuition/salary ratios shown in the above tables probably reflect more salary 
growth than would be the case if lower adjusted mean salaries were used for the last few years 
in which NALP has been calculating adjusted mean salaries. If the lower adjusted mean salaries 
had been used in calculating the ratios, the ratios of tuition to salary would be higher, indicating 
an even greater decrease in affordability than the tables above suggest. See JOBS & JDS, supra 
note 3, and accompanying text. 
 9. Chen, supra note 1, at 1187. 
 10. Id. at 1189. The front-end ratio represents the percentage of a borrower’s gross 
monthly income used to pay the monthly mortgage payment (consisting of principal, interest, 
taxes, and insurance). Front-End Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/ 
front-endratio.asp#axzz28BSaEAHc (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). By contrast, the back-end ratio 
represents the percentage of a borrower’s gross monthly income used to pay all debt obligation 
payments—mortgage, auto loans, educational loans, credit cards, etc., combined. Back-End 
Ratio, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/back-endratio.asp#axzz28Ig9COAJ 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
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front-end ratio of 31 percent and a back-end ratio of 43 percent.
11
 
This results in a “spread” of between 8 percent and 12 percent. 
Professor Chen’s premise, in its simplest form, is that if a law school 
graduate wants to be able to purchase a modest home, her educational 
debt should not exceed that 8 or 12 percent spread and ideally should 
be closer to 4 percent to allow for additional debt in the form of 
automobile loans and credit cards.
12
 Professor Chen provides 
formulas for calculating the “educational back-end ratio” (EBER), 
assuming a 25-year amortization at 6 percent for educational loans, 
and for converting the EBER to an “educational debt to annual 
income ratio” (EDAI), which compares overall educational 
indebtedness to annual income.
13
 Based on the spreads set forth 
above and his formulae for calculating EBER and converting EBER 
to EDAI, Professor Chen offers the following chart to describe the 
financial viability of law graduates in relation to EBER and EDAI.
14
 
 
TABLE 6: FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF LAW GRADUATES AS REFLECTED 
IN EDUCATIONAL BACK-END RATIO (EBER) AND EDUCATIONAL 
DEBT TO ANNUAL INCOME (EDAI) 
FINANCIAL VIABILITY 
OF LAW SCHOOL 
GRADUATES 
EBER (EDUCATIONAL BACK-
END RATIO OR RATIO OF 
MONTHLY EDUCATIONAL 
DEBT SERVICE TO MONTHLY 
GROSS INCOME) 
EDAI (EDUCATIONAL 
DEBT TO ANNUAL 
INCOME) 
Good 0.04 .5 
Adequate 0.08 1.0 
Marginal 0.12 1.5 
 
Using this delineation of financial viability, Professor Chen 
develops another simpler, more generalized formula for considering 
the financial viability of law school graduates, assuming that for most 
law school graduates law school debt will equal three times annual 
tuition.
15
 For good financial viability—an EDAI of .5— a graduate’s 
 
 11. Chen, supra note 1, at 1188–89.  
 12. Id. at 1197–99. 
 13. Id. at 1194–97. 
 14. Id. at 1198–99. 
 15. Note that this assumption may not reflect reality as it assumes BOTH no 
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salary should be twice the total law school debt (or six times annual 
tuition).
16
 For adequate financial viability—an EDAI of 1.0—the 
graduate’s salary should equal the total law school debt (or three 
times annual tuition).
17
 For marginal financial viability—an EDAI of 
1.5—the graduate’s salary should be two-thirds of that graduate’s law 
school debt or two times her annual tuition.
18
 
With this framework in mind and with the new employment 
outcome data published on a per school basis by the ABA Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
19
 and NALP’s summary 
of salary data by employment category,
20
 one can begin to reasonably 
estimate the percentage of law graduates who manifest marginal or 
better financial viability and the percentage of law graduates who 
manifest less than marginal financial viability. 
To develop these estimates, I worked with a student research 
assistant to build a database using the following process. First, we 
entered each law school’s full-time annual tuition for the 2010–11 
academic year from the 2012 ABA-LSAC Official Guide—starting 
with resident tuition for public law schools.
21
 Second, we doubled 
 
undergraduate educational debt AND no law school debt associated with the cost of living 
while in law school. Id. at 1203. With respect to undergraduate educational debt, Professor 
Chen noted in a previous publication that the average undergraduate debt for 2010 graduates of 
colleges and universities was $25,520. Id. at 1200; see also Press Release, The Project on 
Student Debt, Average Student Debt Tops $25,000 for Class of 2010 in Tough Job Market 
(Nov. 3, 2011), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/Student_Debt_and_the_ 
Class_of_2010_NR.pdf. Professor Chen also assumes law students can cover their costs of 
living through some combination of savings, earnings while in law school, and family support. 
Chen, supra note 1, at 1203. 
 16. Chen, supra note 1, at 1203. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Legal Education Statistics: Law School Graduate Employment Data—
Employment Summary Report, A.B.A., LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR SECTION, 
http://employmentsummary.abaquestionnaire.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) [hereinafter ABA 
Employment Summary Report]. 
 20. Class of 2011 National Summary Report, NAT’L ASS’N OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 
(July, 2012), http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummChart_Classof2011.pdf [hereinafter NALP 
2011 Employment Summary]. 
 21. ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, 2012 Edition, LSAC, 
http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/publications/official-guide-archives.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 
2013) [hereinafter 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide]. One could argue that the more representative 
tuition would be the 2009–10 tuition that likely reflects the “average” tuition a graduate of law 
school in 2011 paid during her three years of law school. Given that Professor Chen’s formula 
arguably understates educational indebtedness by assuming no undergraduate debt for law 
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those tuition amounts to reflect two times annual tuition (the 
minimum threshold for marginal financial ability as described 
above).
22
 Third, we examined each law school’s employment 
outcome profile for the Class of 2011 as presented on the ABA’s 
website
23
 and, for each employment category listed on the 
employment outcome profile, attributed to each full-time employed 
graduate the median salary assigned to that employment category in 
the NALP 2011 Employment Summary.
24
 Fourth, we determined the 
number of full-time employed graduates for whom the imputed 
median salary exceeded two times the law school’s annual tuition and 
the number of full-time employed graduates for whom the imputed 
median salary was less than two times the law school’s annual 
tuition. Fifth, we added all graduates who were listed as unemployed 
seeking, unemployed not seeking, unknown, or employed part-time 
to the number of full-time employed graduates for whom the imputed 
median salary was less than two times the law school’s annual 
tuition, as it seemed appropriate to assume that none of the graduates 
in these categories could be expected to have a salary in excess of 
two times the school’s annual tuition.25 
Through this process, we are able to make a rough estimate of the 
percentage of graduates from the Class of 2011 who have at least 
marginal financial viability and the percentage of graduates from the 
Class of 2011 who do not have at least marginal financial viability 
using Professor Chen’s formula. Using this methodology across all 
law schools, the estimated percentage of graduates from the Class of 
2011 with at least marginal financial viability was roughly 33 
percent, while the estimated percentage of graduates from the Class 
 
school graduates, it seemed appropriate to “balance” the scales a bit by using 2010–11 tuition 
for those graduating in 2011—the highest tuition amount for a 2012 graduate’s three years in 
law school. 
 22. See Chen, supra note 1, and accompanying text and table. 
 23. See ABA Employment Summary Report, supra note 19. 
 24. See NALP 2011 Employment Summary, supra note 20. 
 25. Note that we excluded from each school’s total number of graduates those who were 
pursuing an advanced degree and those who had obtained deferred employment, as it seemed 
less appropriate to make assumptions (positively or negatively) about the income levels of those 
groups.  
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of 2011 with less than marginal financial viability was roughly 67 
percent.
26
 
Of course, the analysis reflected in the preceding paragraph 
speaks to the “marginal” law student’s economic situation but not to 
every law student’s economic situation: the analysis assumes that all 
law students pay full tuition, which is likely true for the “marginal” 
law student—the last law student admitted into the entering class for 
a law school—but not for every law student. For the 2011–12 
academic year, nearly 50 percent of all law students received some 
type of grant or scholarship to defray a portion of tuition costs.
27
 The 
average of the median scholarship amounts awarded across all law 
schools during the 2010–11 academic year was $11,043.28 When one 
recognizes that nearly 50 percent of law school graduates were not 
paying full tuition but received some type of scholarship assistance, it 
is apparent that the analysis described in the preceding paragraph 
“overstates” the estimated number of graduates who have less than 
marginal financial viability.
29
 With that in mind, we attempted to 
adjust the financial viability analysis to account for scholarships. 
There is no perfect way to do this, as most schools offer a range of 
scholarships and the available data is not very discriminating.
30
 But 
believing that the full picture of law school affordability cannot be 
fully understood without some accounting for scholarships, we made 
simple scholarship-related adjustments to our data using the 
following process.  
First, we took the information in the 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide 
describing the median scholarship awarded by each law school, 
subtracted this from the tuition, and then doubled the resulting “net 
tuition” to reflect the “two times net tuition” cutoff point for marginal 
 
 26. Chart on file with author compiling affordability analysis across all law schools 
[hereinafter Affordability Analysis Chart]. 
 27. Chart on file with author compiling scholarship/grant data from the 2012 ABA-LSAC 
Guide, supra note 21 [hereinafter Scholarship/Grant Chart]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. While the analysis overstates the number of actual graduates with less than marginal 
financial viability, it does provide a meaningful macro-level estimate of the “likelihood”—
roughly two-thirds—that a marginal student (one paying full tuition) will graduate with less 
than marginal financial viability.  
 30. 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide, supra note 21. 
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financial viability.
31
 We then used the same process described above 
to determine the number of full-time employed graduates for whom 
the imputed median salary from NALP exceeded two times the law 
school’s net tuition and the number of full-time employed graduates 
for whom the imputed median salary was less than two times the law 
school’s net tuition. As indicated above, we then added to the number 
of full-time employed graduates whose imputed median salary was 
less than two times the law school’s net tuition the graduates who 
were listed as unemployed seeking, unemployed not seeking, 
unknown, or employed part-time.  
Of course, the problem with this scholarship-adjusted analysis so 
far is that it overstates the number of graduates estimated to have at 
least marginal financial viability because the calculations so far 
assume all graduates paid “net tuition” (just as the analysis above 
overstated the number of graduates with less than marginal financial 
viability because the analysis assumed all graduates were paying full 
tuition). In fact, the 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide lists for each law school 
the percentage of students who received scholarship assistance. In 
calculating the number of graduates with at least marginal financial 
viability taking into account net tuition, only the number of students 
receiving scholarships should be included in the “net tuition” 
calculations. To account for the reality that a subset of students are 
paying greater or lesser amounts of “net tuition” while a subset of 
students are paying “full tuition,” we first multiplied the number of 
graduates with less than marginal financial viability based on two 
times “net tuition” (accounting for scholarships) by the percentage of 
scholarship recipients. We then multiplied the number of graduates 
with less than marginal financial viability based on full tuition by the 
percentage of students who did not have scholarships. Then we added 
these two “subset” totals together to represent the best estimate of 
 
 31. This simple analysis likely understates the financial viability of those who received 
more than the median scholarship and for whom two times net tuition would be a smaller 
amount than reflected by the median scholarship, but it also likely overstates the financial 
viability of those who received less than the median scholarship and for whom two times net 
tuition would be a larger amount than reflected by the median scholarship. For purposes of this 
estimation, we are assuming these differences balance out, although the actual distribution of 
scholarships at any given law school might mean more or fewer graduates realizing at least 
marginal financial viability.  
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those with less than marginal financial viability, taking into account 
that some percentage of graduates were paying net tuition while the 
balance were paying full tuition.
32
 Based on this process and using 
Chen’s formula, we are able to make a rough estimate of the 
percentage of graduates from the Class of 2011 who have at least 
marginal financial viability after accounting for scholarship 
assistance and the percentage of such graduates who do not have at 
least marginal financial viability after accounting for scholarship 
assistance. Across all law schools and after accounting for 
scholarships in the manner described above, the estimated percentage 
of graduates from the Class of 2011 who have marginal financial 
viability increased from roughly 33 percent to roughly 46.5 percent, 
while the estimated percentage of such graduates who have less than 
marginal financial viability declined from roughly 67 percent to 
roughly 53.5 percent.
33
 Notably, using this more finely adjusted data, 
54 law schools would be estimated to have at least 70 percent of their 
2011 graduates demonstrating marginal financial viability,
34
 while 
105 law schools would be estimated to have less than 50 percent of 
their 2011 graduates demonstrating marginal financial viability.
35
 
Taking scholarships into account thus presents a slightly less 
discouraging picture of financial viability for law school graduates, 
but certainly not a rosy picture, particularly when one remembers that 
 
 32. An example may help illuminate this process. Assume a law school charging $35,000 
full tuition with 100 graduates. Assume that 40 percent of those graduates had scholarships and 
the median scholarship was $10,000, such that “net tuition” would be $25,000 for those 
scholarship students. Based on two times the full tuition and the employment outcomes for the 
law school’s 100 graduates, 72 graduates were estimated to have less than marginal financial 
viability. Based on two times “net tuition” and the employment outcomes for the law school’s 
graduates, 48 graduates were estimated to have less than marginal financial viability. This 
means that accounting for net tuition, there were 24 additional graduates with marginal 
financial viability—e.g., making more than $50,000, but less than $70,000. Recognizing that 60 
of the graduates should have had their financial viability calculated based on full tuition while 
40 of the graduates should have had their financial viability calculated using “net tuition,” we 
take 72 times .60 (60%) (a result of 43.2) and 48 times .40 (40%) (a result of 19.2) and then add 
those results (43.2 + 19.2 = 62.4 or 62) to get 62 graduates with less than marginal financial 
viability taking into account the subset of students who were paying net tuition. 
 33. Affordability Analysis Chart, supra note 26. 
 34. Nearly all of these law schools are public law schools with relatively modest tuition. 
 35. Affordability Analysis Chart, supra note 26. 
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these results presume no undergraduate educational debt and no 
borrowing to cover costs of living while in law school.
36
 
Of course, the simplistic accounting for scholarships used in the 
above calculations fails to capture the much more nuanced reality of 
law school pricing. The 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide provides slightly 
more detailed scholarship information, including the percentage of 
scholarship recipients with full scholarships or more, the percentage 
with half-to-full scholarships, and the percentage with less than half 
scholarships.
37
 While one could perhaps make reasonable estimations 
concerning the financial viability of those receiving half-to-full or 
full scholarships because their net tuition generally would be even 
less than the net tuition calculated using the median scholarship, 
reasonable estimations regarding the financial viability of those 
receiving less than half scholarships are not feasible because it is 
impossible to know how much less than half tuition such scholarships 
were. 
Nonetheless, from the standpoint of a prospective law student or a 
pre-law advisor discussing law school options with a prospective law 
student, one can use this framework to make a reasonable assessment 
of that student’s likelihood of having at least marginal financial 
viability after graduation. 
 First, if a prospective law student’s law school options all 
involve paying full tuition, then the prospective student 
generally has only a one in three chance of graduating with 
marginal financial viability. But if the prospective law 
student’s law school options are a private law school or a 
public law school (for which the student is paying non-
resident tuition), the student is even less likely to graduate 
with marginal financial viability. On the other hand, if the 
prospective law student’s options include a public law 
school for which the student qualifies for resident tuition, 
the student is more likely to graduate with marginal 
financial viability.  
 
 36. See supra note 15. 
 37. See 2012 ABA-LSAC Guide, supra note 21.  
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 Second, if a prospective law student has a full-tuition law 
school scholarship (and assuming that retaining the 
scholarship is not contingent on maintaining a difficult-to-
achieve law school GPA),
38
 then obviously the student is 
likely to graduate with at least marginal financial viability 
(unless the student comes to law school with a tremendous 
amount of undergraduate educational debt and proceeds to 
borrow significantly to cover the cost of living while in law 
school). 
 Third, if a prospective law student receives scholarship 
offers for less than full tuition, the student and her advisor 
should carefully assess what her “net tuition cost” will be at 
each of the law schools from which she receives a 
scholarship offer, taking into account the likelihood of 
retaining or not retaining the scholarship if the school has a 
competitive scholarship retention program.
39
 Once a 
determination is made regarding the student’s specific 
anticipated “net tuition cost” at each school, the student 
should multiply that net tuition cost by two and then look at 
each school’s employment outcomes,40 integrate the median 
salaries for each job category from NALP’s annual 
summary,
41
 and calculate an estimated percentage of recent 
graduates from that school who had at least marginal 
 
 38. See Jerome M. Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of 
Law School, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 183–89 (2011) (discussing the challenges presented for 
students at law schools with “competitive” scholarship retention programs).  
 39. See Affordability Analysis Chart, supra note 26. In addition to considering 
scholarship retention issues, non-resident students considering public law schools should 
evaluate the likelihood of qualifying for resident tuition during their second and third law 
school years. See, e.g., Tuition and Residency: Colorado Law is Affordable, UNIV. OF COL. 
LAW SCH., http://www.colorado.edu/law/admissions/tuition.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2012) 
(noting that non-resident students may establish residency after one year and providing a link to 
residency requirements). Qualifying for resident tuition can function as the equivalent of a 
“scholarship,” saving a student several thousand dollars each year. Resident 2012–13 tuition at 
the University of Colorado Law School is $31,154, while non-resident tuition is $37,940. By 
qualifying as a resident after the first year, a student can save $6,786 or 18 percent per year for 
her second and third years and achieve average savings of nearly 12 percent over the three 
tuition years required for graduation. Id. 
 40. See ABA Employment Summary Report, supra note 19. 
 41. See NALP 2011 Employment Summary, supra note 20. 
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financial viability (incomes greater than two times the “net 
tuition cost”). 
The unfortunate reality, however, is that the lives and financial 
fortunes of the “marginal” law student and the “average” law student 
are intertwined at many law schools. At many law schools the 
scholarships offered to students are based on tuition-discounting, 
which means marginal law students pay more in tuition to reduce 
tuition for those receiving scholarships.
42
 The very scholarship 
system that reduces “net tuition cost” and makes it more likely that 
scholarship recipients will graduate with at least marginal financial 
viability also increases “net tuition cost” for students without 
scholarships and makes it more likely that such students will graduate 
with less than marginal financial viability.
43
 If law schools 
significantly pared back their scholarship programs, they could lower 
 
 42. See Organ, supra note 38, at 186 n.22 (“[T]hose with lower objective criteria (LSAT 
and UGPA) effectively subsidize the legal education of those with higher scores, as most 
scholarship programs are not funded by endowments but are funded by tuition discounting—by 
tuition-paying students.” Daniel J. Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 254, 
269 (2006).); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 99 (discussing “reverse Robin Hood” 
scholarship dynamic). 
 43. An example might help. Assume a law school with 100 students and a budget of $3 
million. To cover the budget, the law school would need to charge tuition of $30,000, assuming 
no scholarship program. If the school uses tuition-discounting to provide scholarship assistance 
for some students, the school would need to charge higher tuition to cover the cost of the 
scholarship program in addition to its $3 million budget. For example, if the school wants to 
provide 20 students with scholarships of $20,000 and 20 students with scholarships of $10,000, 
it would have a “scholarship budget” of $600,000. To cover the $600,000 scholarship program 
and its original $3 million budget, the school would need to reset its tuition at $36,000 ($3.6 
million/100). Net of the scholarships, 20 students would actually pay $16,000 ($320,000 total), 
20 students would actually pay $26,000 ($520,000 total), and 60 students would pay the full 
$36,000 in upwardly adjusted tuition ($2,160,000 total), resulting in total tuition revenue of $3 
million net of scholarships—its original budget. Thus, to generate scholarship assistance and 
reduce the net tuition cost for the 40 scholarship recipients, the law school needs to increase 
tuition for those not receiving any scholarships by $6,000, or 20 percent. 
 This example is close to macro-level reality. If all students in all law schools paid full 
tuition in 2011, law schools would have received roughly $5 billion in tuition revenue. But 
nearly 50 percent of law school students received an average median scholarship award of 
nearly $12,000 resulting in an aggregate of nearly $1 billion in total scholarship assistance. This 
means “net tuition” received by law schools was roughly $4 billion. Assuming all of this 
scholarship money were derived through tuition discounting (not a completely realistic 
assumption as many schools have endowed scholarships), law schools could conceivably 
reduce tuition by nearly 20 percent if they had no scholarship programs at all. Obviously, a 20 
percent tuition reduction would significantly help the financial viability equation for the 
marginal student. 
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the “face cost” of tuition, significantly helping the financial viability 
equation for the marginal student while only marginally impairing the 
financial viability equation for scholarship students as they also 
would benefit from lower actual tuition. 
Interestingly, the results described here in Part II should not be 
surprising in light of the shift in the tuition/salary ratios reflected in 
Part I.
44
 Indeed, looking at the 2011 ratios of resident, non-resident, 
and private school tuitions to average overall income, one sees ratios 
of .28, .44, and .5, respectively.
45
 If these ratios are flipped to reflect 
income over tuition, the resulting ratios are roughly 3.5 to 1, 2.25 to 
1, and 2 to 1, respectively. For non-resident graduates of public law 
schools and for graduates of private law schools, these ratios of 
average overall income to average tuition are barely in the marginal 
financial viability category using Professor Chen’s analysis. Only 
resident graduates of public law schools, with an average overall 
income to overall average tuition ratio of 3.5 to 1, manifest adequate 
financial viability in this aggregated analysis. 
III. AFFORDABILITY DIFFERENCES WITHIN TYPES OF LAW SCHOOLS 
AND ACROSS STATES AND REGIONS AND PROFILES 
Of course, the above “macro” discussion fails to highlight 
differences in affordability factors at a “micro” level—different 
tuitions, scholarship funding, and employment outcomes in particular 
types of law schools, differences in tuition rates across states and 
regions, and differences in LSAT and GPA profiles. 
Some private schools with relatively modest tuition or with 
relatively generous scholarship programs and fairly strong 
employment profiles may have a significantly higher percentage of 
graduates with at least marginal financial viability than other private 
schools with higher tuition or relatively less generous scholarship 
programs and less robust employment profiles. Similarly, some 
public schools still benefit from a greater state subsidy than other 
public schools. As a result, annual resident tuition at some public 
schools is less than $20,000, while annual resident tuition at others 
 
 44. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 45. See supra Tables 3, 4, and 5 for year 2011 in “Tuition to Average Salary” columns. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 41:33 
 
 
exceeds $40,000. The significantly lower tuition at some schools 
makes it much more likely that a higher percentage of their graduates 
will have at least marginal financial viability, even if the jobs those 
graduates obtain pay more modest salaries than jobs typically 
obtained by graduates of some schools with higher tuition.  
Similarly, the “macro” discussion fails to highlight the extent to 
which differences exist across geographic regions of the country. 
Legal education in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York 
is very expensive, relatively speaking, with annual tuition at forty-
seven law schools exceeding $37,000 and tuition less than $21,000 at 
only four schools.
46
 Notably, nearly one-third of the entering class of 
law students in 2011 attended one of these fifty-one schools.
47
 In 
contrast, legal education is fairly affordable in Arkansas, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Tennessee, 
home to sixteen law schools, of which thirteen public schools offer 
annual resident tuition of less than $18,000, while annual tuition at 
the remaining three private schools exceeds $36,000.
48
  
When one looks at the entering class profiles of law schools in 
conjunction with variations in tuition and scholarship opportunities, 
one can begin to see that within and across geographic regions the 
affordability issues become even more pronounced when variations 
in LSAT and GPA profiles are taken into account. For example, in 
Arizona, the two public law schools offer relatively affordable annual 
resident tuition at roughly $26,000,
49
 but their entering classes in fall 
 
 46. The fifty-one law schools in the states of California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New 
York referenced here are those that have received full accreditation from the ABA Section of 
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar. The four “affordable” law schools based on 2010–
11 in-state tuition are Northern Illinois ($18,688) and Southern Illinois ($15,994) in Illinois, and 
City University of New York ($12,207) and State University of New York-Buffalo ($20,818) in 
New York. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27. 
 47. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27. Total fall 2011 first-year enrollment at these 
fifty-one law schools was just less than 14,602; 549 students, less than 4 percent of the total, 
were enrolled in the four “affordable” law schools. Chart on file with author compiling 2011 
first-year enrollment and profile data from the 2013 ABA-LSAC Guide [hereinafter 2011 
Enrollment Profile Chart]. 
 48. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27. The sixteen law schools referenced here are 
those that have received full accreditation from the ABA Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar. Total fall 2011 first-year enrollment at these sixteen law schools was 
2,463, of which 731, just under 30 percent, were enrolled in one of the three more expensive 
private law schools. 2011 Enrollment Profile Chart, supra note 47. 
 49. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27.   
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2011 had no more than seventy-five total spots for students with 
LSAT scores at or below 157.
50
 Those with lower scores who want to 
stay in Arizona for law school must attend Phoenix Law School with 
tuition of more than $37,000 per year.
51
 While many Phoenix Law 
School first-year students may benefit from scholarship assistance 
that lowers net tuition, it is likely that more than two hundred 
Phoenix first-year students—likely those with lower LSAT/GPA 
profiles—pay full tuition.52  
Thus, while the “macro” analysis highlights the extent to which 
law students are facing significant affordability issues in the 
aggregate, the “micro” reality suggests that lack of affordability is 
particularly pronounced in some geographic regions (specifically 
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York), and most acutely 
for “marginal” students with lower LSAT/GPA profiles who will not 
often have the benefit of significant scholarship assistance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This analysis demonstrates that generally speaking, legal 
education is significantly less affordable than it was in the mid-1980s 
for students across all types of law schools. But more specifically, the 
affordability of legal education depends significantly on where one 
chooses to go to law school and whether one has a scholarship. In 
some geographic regions, legal education remains particularly 
affordable for resident students at public law schools. Across the 
country, whether at public law schools or private law schools, legal 
education generally is relatively affordable for those students 
receiving scholarships at or above the average median scholarship 
across law schools. Unfortunately, for students with the least robust 
LSAT/GPA profiles, for whom scholarship opportunities are much 
 
 50. 2011 Enrollment Profile Chart, supra note 47. Arizona and Arizona State had 305 
total first-year students enrolled in fall 2011, but with twenty-fifth percentile LSATs of 158 and 
160, respectively; fewer than seventy-five students had LSATs of 157 or below. 
 51. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27. 
 52. Scholarship/Grant Chart, supra note 27. Roughly 56 percent of all Phoenix students 
received scholarships in 2010–11, with a median scholarship award of $7,000. With 450 first-
year students, if 44 percent did not have scholarships, that would total 200 first-year students 
paying more than $37,000 tuition. Id.  
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less likely to be available and for which it might not even be possible 
to gain admission to the public law school in the state in which they 
reside, law school is an expensive proposition for which the return on 
investment is questionable. These students are most likely to find 
themselves among the graduates experiencing less than marginal 
financial viability. 
In a recent critique of Brian Tamanaha’s book, Failing Law 
Schools, Philip Schrag suggests that regardless of where one goes to 
school and whether one has a scholarship, affordability is no longer 
an issue due to income-based repayment (IBR) of federal loans and 
particularly the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) program.
53
 In 2007, 
Congress passed the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, which, 
among other things, resulted in an income-based repayment program 
for eligible graduates with federal loans.
54
 Congress amended this 
approach to IBR when it passed the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, making the IBR even more generous, but 
with a delayed implementation, applicable to loans issued on or after 
July 1, 2014.
55
 In October 2011, President Obama announced the 
PAYE program, making the more generous IBR provisions from the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 available as 
soon as 2012.
56
 The final regulations for the PAYE program were 
issued on November 1, 2012.
57
 Under the PAYE program, the 
amount of debt does not matter, as payment obligations are based 
 
 53. Philip G. Schrag, Failing Law Schools: Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2179625. 
 54. Pub. L. No. 110-84 (Sept. 27, 2007), 20 U.S.C. § 1098(e). IBR limited payments to 15 
percent of a borrower’s adjusted gross income less 150 percent of the poverty line applicable to 
the borrower’s family size, extended the payment period from the standard ten-year period to 
twenty-five years, and provided for the forgiveness of any balance remaining at the end of 
twenty-five years. Id. 
 55. H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. § 2213 (2010) (enacted) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e)). 
For borrowers whose first loan was issued on or after July 1, 2014, this amendment limited 
payments to 10 percent of a borrower’s adjusted gross income less 150 percent of the poverty 
line applicable to the borrower’s family size and limited the payment period to twenty years. Id. 
 56. See Fact Sheet: Help Americans Manage Student Loan Debt, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/25/fact-sheet-help-americans-man 
age-student-loan-debt. 
 57. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William 
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66088 (Nov. 1, 2012). PAYE is available 
to any borrower who had undergraduate federal loans or federally guaranteed loans before 
October 2007. 
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completely upon the income of the borrower.
58
 Thus, according to 
Schrag, Tamanaha’s concerns (and my concerns) about the 
affordability of legal education given the high cost and generally 
modest incomes for those lucky enough to find jobs are overblown 
because the repayment obligations of law graduates eligible for 
PAYE will be very manageable given that the repayment obligations 
are based on income levels not debt levels.
59
 
In a recent blog posting, Tamanaha concedes the accuracy of 
Schrag’s description of the reality of how PAYE will function to 
make legal education “affordable” regardless of the tuition charged 
by law schools or the amount borrowed by law graduates, but notes 
that the need for this type of program to make legal education 
affordable highlights how unaffordable legal education has become.
60
 
Tamanaha also expresses three concerns regarding PAYE. First, he 
highlights that the end result of the loan forgiveness aspect of PAYE 
at the end of twenty years will be a significant tax obligation for 
borrowers whose payments were inadequate to reduce significantly 
the amount of indebtedness over time.
61
 Second, he notes that the 
fiscal consequences of the PAYE program may make it a prime focus 
of budget cutters looking to do something about the federal budget 
deficit.
62
 Third, he notes the profound moral hazard involved in a 
program that creates no incentive for law schools to limit tuition 
increases and no incentive for students to limit borrowing.
63
 I agree 
with all of these concerns. 
Perhaps more significantly, however, the market has not been 
persuaded by PAYE as the panacea for making legal education 
affordable. Legal education is built on a financial model that works 
only if a significant number of students are willing to pay full tuition. 
To the extent that limited employment opportunities and modest 
income for graduates make the law school investment equation seem 
 
 58. See Brian Tamanaha, What’s Wrong with Income-Based Repayment in Legal 
Academia: A Response to Schrag, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 29, 2012) http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2012/11/whats-wrong-with-income-based-repayment.html. 
 59. See supra note 53. 
 60. See supra note 58. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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less viable for the student with a modest to low LSAT/GPA profile 
who will be expected to pay full tuition—law schools are going to 
find themselves with fewer and fewer students to fill their seats even 
with the availability of PAYE.
64
 
This reality has been reflected in the declining applications to law 
school in the 2011 and 2012 admissions cycles (declining from 
87,500 to 68,000 in that two-year period).
65
 It also has been reflected 
in declining first-year enrollment across law schools in 2011 and 
again in 2012.
66
 The early returns for fall 2013 also are discouraging 
as the number of LSATs administered in June and October 2012 was 
down 12.5 percent from the number of LSATs administered in June 
and October 2011.
67
 Indeed, the recently announced LSAC Current 
Volume Three-Year Summary indicates that applicants are down 
over 20 percent compared to last year at this time.
68
 Nonetheless, law 
schools continued to increase tuition for fall 2012,
69
 even as 
employment outcomes continued to deteriorate,
70
 making the value 
proposition even less tenable for prospective law students, who are 
increasingly well-informed about both the costs of legal education 
 
 64. See Bernie Burke, What Matters Most (in legal ed these days), FACULTY LOUNGE 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/11/what-matters-most-in-legal-ed-these-
days.html?cid=6a00e54f871a9c8833017c338880a8970b (noting that the biggest problem for 
legal education these days is that there are too many graduates and not enough jobs). 
 65. See LSAC Volume Summary, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-
volume-summary.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).  
 66. See Jerome M. Organ, UPDATED Comparison of 2010 and 2011 Enrollment and 
Profile Data Among Law Schools, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Aug. 16, 2012), http://lawprofessors 
.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/08/updated-comparison-of-2010-and-2011-enrollment-and-pro 
file-data-among-law-schools.html#comments (for the 2010–11 comparisons); Jerome M. Organ, 
Unofficial Comparison of 2010 and 2012 Enrollment and Profile Data and Thoughts on 2013, 
LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Nov. 28, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012 
/11/unofficial-comparison-of-2010-and-2012-enrollment-and-profile-data-and-thoughts-on-2013 
.html (for the 2010–12 comparisons). 
 67. See LSATs Administered, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-admin 
istered.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 68. See LSAC Current Volume—Three-Year Summary, LSAC, http://www.lsac.org/lsacre 
sources/data/three-year-volume.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).  
 69. See Karen Sloan, Tuition is Still Growing, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www 
.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202567898209&Tuition_is_still_growing&slreturn=2012
1029135537. 
 70. See Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP Bulletin 
(July 2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research. 
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and the realistic employment outcomes given increasing transparency 
regarding employment data for law school graduates.  
What does this mean for legal education? Until more law schools 
“rebalance” the value proposition for law students, particularly for 
the students with the lower LSAT/GPA profiles who are expected to 
pay full tuition, or until the employment market begins to improve 
significantly, the enrollment numbers likely will continue to slide. 
This will be painful for many law schools that already are 
experiencing significant budget challenges from the declines in 
enrollment in 2011 and 2012.
71
 Just as law firms down-sized through 
2009 and into 2010 in response to declining revenues, law schools 
likely will be down-sizing in 2013 and beyond. Law schools also will 
have to explore ways to continue to provide a high quality legal 
education more cost-effectively, just as law firms have been 
exploring ways to provide high quality legal services more cost-
effectively over the last few years. While this will be a tumultuous 
time for legal education, it also may prove to be a time in which 
necessity breeds meaningful innovation and reform. As with any time 
of significant market disruption, there likely will be winners and 
losers, but only time will tell us which law schools are the winners 
and which are the losers. 
 
 71. See Organ, Unofficial Comparison of 2010 and 2012 Enrollment and Profile Data and 
Thoughts on 2013, supra note 66. There are at least fifty-nine law schools that have seen a 
decline in first-year enrollment of at least 20 percent between 2010 and 2012. For some of these 
law schools, that is a decline of one hundred or more students, and a likely loss of $2 million or 
more in annual tuition revenue (assuming a net tuition of only $20,000 per student after 
accounting for scholarships), possibly a loss of $6 million or more in annual tuition revenue if 
the decline in enrollment continues for three years. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, New Vermont Law 
School Dean Taking on $3.3M Budget Shortfall, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.law 
.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202579363738&New_Vermont_Law_School_dean_taking_ 
on_33M_budget_shortfall_. Interestingly, while dozens of schools will be dealing with these 
types of budget challenges this year and in the coming years, the only two recent news stories 
regarding these types of restructuring at law schools were this Vermont story and a story in 
May 2012 regarding downsizing at the University of California Hastings College of Law. See 
UC-Hastings Reduces Incoming Class by 20%, Cuts 27 Staff Positions, TAXPROF BLOG (Apr. 
27, 2012), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/04/uc-hastings.html. 
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